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People v. Tamborrino: Should Inquiry By
a Trial Judge Into Confidential
Communication Between the Attorney
and the Accused Be Harmless Error?
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Tamborrino, the California Court of Appeal held
that a trial judge's violation of the criminal defendant's attorney-
client privilege, in the presence of the jury, was harmless error., By a
divided court, the majority held this type of constitutional error
should be evaluated for prejudice under the harmless error doctrine
established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chapman v. California.'
Under Chapman, an error is harmless if the court concludes beyond
a reasonable doubt that the evidence complained of did not contrib-
ute to the conviction.3 The Tamborrino majority, applying the harm-
less error standard, determined the error did not contribute to the
conviction and therefore affirmed the trial court's findings."
The dissent argued that the error was reversible per se5 because
the questioning of the defendant by the trial judge, in the presence
of the jury, impermissibly infringed on the defendant's sixth amend-
1. People v. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d 575, 263 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1989).
2. Id. at 583, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 735 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967)).
3. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
4. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 585, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
5. Reversible per se means that the error is automatically reversed without any
inquiry into the amount of prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Ar-
sdall, 475 U.S. 673, 677-78 (1986).
ment guarantee of assistance of counsel.6 The dissent asserted that a
trial judge's violation of a criminal defendant's attorney-client privi-
lege, in the presence of a jury, "warrants the sharpest possible sanc-
tion" because of its damage to the constitutional right to counsel.7 In
the alternative, the dissent argued that even under the harmless er-
ror rule, the error was reversible.8
This Note discusses whether the harmless error rule of Chapman9
should apply when the trial judge invades the attorney-client privi-
lege or whether the error should be automatically reversible. Part II
will present the facts of the Tamborrino case, the majority opinion
and the dissent. Part III of this Note will explain the application of
the harmless error rule to sixth amendment violations. Part IV ana-
lyzes whether the harmless error rule should apply to the Tambor-
rino case under federal and California constitutional law.10 In Part
V, this Note proposes that an inquisition by the trial judge regarding
confidential attorney-client communications, in the presence of a
jury, should be grounds for automatic reversal under both the Fed-
eral Constitution and the California Constitution.
I. THE TAMBORRINO CASE
A. Facts of the Tamborrino Case
Gary Tamborrino was on trial for a residential robbery."' The vic-
tim, Deborah Clarke claimed three men forced their way into her
apartment. She stated that one man held a gun to her while the
others ransacked the apartment and stole property.12 During the al-
leged robbery, a jewelry box on the dresser had been moved and
opened.13
6. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 591, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 740-41 (Johnson J.,
dissenting).
7. Id. at 595-96, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 743 (Johnson J., dissenting). Judge Johnson,
the dissenting judge, stated that the inquiry into confidential attorney-client communica-
tions by the trial judge harms the constitutional right to counsel by discouraging full and
open communication between defendants and their attorneys. Id. The dissenting judge
noted however, that there are no California or Federal cases that consider whether this
type of error is automatically reversible. Id. at 595 n.8, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 743 n.8.
8. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 596, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 744 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
9. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Chapman harmless error rule
is: the error is harmless and the conviction must stand if an appellate court concludes,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error had no impact upon the finding of guilt. Id. at
24.
10. Because the focus of this Note is on whether the harmless error rule or a rule
of automatic reversal should govern a violation of a criminal defendant's attorney-client
privilege by a trial judge, the proper application of the harmless error rule to this case
will not be addressed.
11. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 578, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
12. Id. at 579, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
13. Id.
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When the three men left, Clarke got the license number of their
car and called the police.14 The police were able to lift a fingerprint
from the lid of the jewelry box.15 The fingerprint was identified as
belonging to the defendant, Tamborrino.1
Clarke was the sole witness to the robbery and stated she had been
too frightened to look at the robbers' faces.1 Clarke was unable to
identify Tamborrino from a six photo lineup shown to her by the
police. 8 She did, however, report to the police that the gun was
small, and the man who held it wore a green and brown camouflage
hat."9
Six weeks after the alleged robbery, the police pulled over a Dat-
sun automobile with the license number identified by Clarke.2 0
Tamborrino was driving the automobile. 1 In the back of the car, the
police found a camouflage colored hat later identified by Clarke as
the type worn by the robber. 22 The police also found a .25 caliber
handgun under the driver's seat.2
At the trial, Clarke testified that she was remotely related to a
man named Eddie Brown.24 Tamborrino claimed that Eddie Brown
was his stepbrother.25 Tamborrino also testified that he had known
Deborah Clarke since she was in high school and had met her sev-
eral times.26 Clarke, however, testified that she has never had any
relationship with Tamborrino, nor had she ever seen him before.21
After the prosecution's case, which consisted of Deborah Clarke's
testimony and the fingerprint from her jewelry box, Tamborrino took
the stand.28 Tamborrino denied that he committed the robbery and
explained how his fingerprint got on the jewelry box.2 9 He revealed
for the first time during the trial that he had previously sold
14. Id. at 579, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 596, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 744 (Johnson J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 580, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
19. Id. at 579, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 733.








28. Id. at 596-97, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 744 (Johnson J., dissenting). Tamborrino also
admitted to two prior felony convictions for robbery (after the judge ruled that he would
allow the prosecution to offer this evidence anyway). Id. at 589, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
29. Id. at 580-81, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
Deborah Clarke "bad" cocaine.30
He stated that prior to the alleged robbery Clarke asked him to
get her some cocaine.31 Tamborrino said that he had gone to
Clarke's apartment and sold her what she thought were two ounces
of cocaine for $1,600. Tamborrino did not dispute that his finger-
prints were on Clarke's jewelry box. 2 He explained that he must
have touched the box when he sold Clarke the bad cocaine. 3
Tamborrino's testimony implied that Clarke falsely accused him of
robbery because he had sold her "bad" cocaine.
34
While Tamborrino was still on the stand, over defense counsel's
repeated objections, the trial judge asked Tamborrino in the pres-
ence of the jury, "[d]id you tell your lawyer about the story you just
related on the stand?13 5 Tamborrino replied "[n]o. I just told him
what it referred to. I didn't tell all exactly." 6
30. Id. at 591, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Tamborrino alleg-
edly sold Clark lactose or "bunk" cocaine. Id. at 580, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
31. Id. at 580, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 585, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 581, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 734. The full text of the exchange which occurred
in the presence of the jury is as follows:
"THE COURT: Did you tell your lawyer about the
story you just related on the stand?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, excuse me. I must
object to the court's question. That violates the
attorney-client privilege.
THE COURT: Did you tell your lawyer what you have
testified to on the stand today?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May the record reflect my
objection?
THE COURT: Yes, it will so reflect.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Did you tell your lawyer about this
story that you told on the stand?
THE WITNESS [defendant]: No. I just told him what
it referred to. I didn't tell all, exactly.
THE COURT: When did you first tell him that?
THE WITNESS: From the very beginning.
THE COURT: Well, so he knew about it at the time
that Miss Clarke was on the stand, is that correct?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, again my objection
is that that violates the attorney-client privilege, sir.
THE COURT: I know, we have heard that before.
Let's get on with the case. He knew about it before
he was cross examining Miss Clarke, didn't he?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your honor, may we be heard at
side bar, please?
THE COURT: No.
[PROSECUTOR]: May we approach, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes. I will withdraw the last question."
Id. at 592, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 740-41.
36. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 592, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 740-41.
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The judge continued, "[w]hen did you first tell him that?"87
Tamborrino answered, "[f]rom the very beginning. ' '3 8 The judge
then said, "[w]ell, so he knew about it at the time Miss Clarke was
on the stand, is that correct?"39 At that point, the prosecutor, seem-
ingly eager to avoid a mistrial, asked if both attorneys could ap-
proach the bench.40 The jury did not hear any part of the exchange
after that point."" The judge explained to the attorneys that he
wanted to know if the defense counsel knew how Tamborrino would
testify. 2 The trial judge said if the defense counsel did know, the
defense counsel should have asked Clarke if she had purchased any
cocaine from Tamborrino.4 s
The defense moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the ques-
tions by the judge violated the attorney-client privilege.4 4 The trial
judge denied the motion, insisting that no privilege was violated be-
cause Tamborrino disclosed in court what he had told his attorney. 5
According to the trial judge, Tamborrino waived the privilege de-
spite defense counsel's repeated objections. 6
The jury found Tamborrino guilty of residential robbery. 7
Tamborrino appealed the judgment to the California Court of Ap-
peal in the Second Appellate District.48 The Court of Appeal af-




40. Id. at 592, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 741 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 582, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 734. The trial judge revealed that his questions
were to determine if defense counsel knew how Tamborrino would testify at the time he
cross-examined Clarke. Id. According to the trial judge, "if [defense counsel did know],
he should have asked her [Clarke] if she bought any cocaine from [Tamborrino]." Id.
Defense counsel responded "that he 'made a tactical decision not to ask her [Clarke]'
and [that] the prosecution has the right to recall her". Id. The prosecutor later at-
tempted to recall Clarke but was unable to contact her. Id. The prosecutor, however, felt
it was unnecessary because of her previous denials that she had ever met Tamborrino. Id.




46. Id. at 592, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 741 (Johnson, J., dissenting). According to the
trial judge, Tamborrino waived the attorney-client privilege when Tamborrino took the
stand and testified about the drug transaction he had with Ms. Clarke. Id. A defendant,
however, does not waive his attorney-client privilege by testifying concerning facts which
might have been discussed in confidence with his attorney. Mass v. Superior Court, 175
Cal. App. 3d 601, 606, 221 Cal. Rptr. 245, 248 (1985).
47. Tamborrino, 215 Cal App. 3d at 578, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
48. Id. at 575, 263 Cal. Rptr. 731.
49. Id. at 591, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
February 21, 1990, the Supreme Court of California denied
Tamborrino's petition for review.50
B. The Majority Opinion of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's questions violated
the defendant's attorney-client privilege.51 The majority rejected
Tamborrino's claim that he was denied the right to counsel as guar-
anteed under the sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Ar-
ticle I, section 15 of the California Constitution. 2 The court stated
that there was no denial of counsel to the defendant and that, if any
harm was caused by the judge's questions, "it could have only af-
fected the policy upon which strict confidentiality of the attorney-
client privilege is based .. .
The majority, citing Gideon v. Wainwright,4 acknowledged that a
violation of the guarantee of counsel is reversible per se.55 The court
distinguished Gideon,"8 which involved the complete denial of coun-
sel, from Tamborrino. The court stated, "the judge's questions did
not affect the attorney-client relationship . . . in this trial. . . and
therefore [w]e cannot equate this situation with Gideon57 in which
there was a complete denial of the right to counsel."'5 8
The court also distinguished Tamborrino from Coplon v. United
States,59 Cadwell v. United States,60 and Barber v. Municipal
50. People v. Tamborrino, No. B034031215 (Cal. Feb. 21, 1990) (1990 LEXIS
834 (1990)).
51. Tamborrino, 215 Cal App. 3d at 582, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 734-35. The court also
acknowledged that the defendant did not waive the attorney-client privilege. The court
stated, that, "Defendants testimony concerning facts... related by him to his counsel..
does not constitute waiver of the privilege." Id. at 582, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
52. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 583, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
53. Id.
54. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon involved an indigent de-
fendant that was charged with breaking and entering with the intent to commit a misde-
meanor. Id. This offense was a felony under Florida law. Id. at 336-37. The U.S. Su-
preme Court overturned a Florida Supreme Court ruling that held an indigent defendant
is not entitled to appointed counsel for a felony charge unless the charge is a capital
offense. Id. at 337. The U.S. Supreme court held that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment. Id. at
335.
55. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 583, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
56. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
57. Id.
58. Tamborrino, 215 Cal App. 3d at 584, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
59. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951). In Coplon, the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that where government agents intercepted telephone
messages between the criminal defendant and her attorney, the defendant has been de-
nied the effective aid and assistance of counsel. Id. The court stated that the right to
assistance of counsel is absolute and that no conviction can stand no matter how over-
whelming the evidence of guilt if the accused is denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Id. at 759-60.
60. Cadwell V. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953). In Cadwell, the
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Court,"' all of which involved government interception of confiden-
tial communications between defendants and their attorneys.6 2 In
those three cases, the courts reversed the convictions without requir-
ing the defendants to prove prejudice. 63 In distinguishing Tambor-
rino, the majority held that the breach was not the same as a "seri-
ous breach of confidentiality by the direct invasion by a government
agent of the privacy of a defendant's consultation with his
attorney."6'
The court reasoned that because the error by the trial judge was
less severe than other sixth amendment violations, 5 it did not fit into
the reversible per se category.6" The majority decided that the harm-
less error rule of Chapman6 7 should apply to the case.68 The court
D.C. Circuit Court held that a conviction must be reversed where a government agent
gained access to trial plans of the defense. Id. The court indicated that the defendant
need not show actual prejudice to be entitled to a new trial. Id. at 88 1. The Court stated,
"[t]he Constitutions's... guarantees of... effective representation by counsel, lose most
of their substance if the Government can with impunity place a secret agent in a lawyer's
office to inspect confidential 'papers of the defendant and his advisors, to listen to their
conversations, and to participate in their counsels of defense." Id. According to the D.C.
Circuit, a conviction cannot stand if tainted by this type of conduct by the government.
Id.
61. Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 598 P.2d 818, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658
(1979). Barber involved fifty defendants that were arrested for demonstrating at a nu-
clear power plant. Id. at 745, 598 P.2d at 819, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 659. An undercover
police officer posed as one of the jointly represented defendants. Id. The undercover po-
lice officer attended meetings with defense counsel. Id.
The Supreme Court of California reversed the lower court's ruling that the prosecution
could use evidence if the prosecution could prove that the evidence was obtained indepen-
dently of the undercover agent. Id. at 760, 598 P.2d 828, 157 Cal. Rptr. 668. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that the defendants' right to confer privately with their coun-
sel was violated and ordered the suit dismissed. Id. For a more detailed discussion of
Barber, see infra Part IV, Subpart C.
62. Tamborrino, 215 Cal App. 3d at 583, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
63. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Cadwell v. United
States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953); and Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742,
598 P.2d 818, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1979).
64. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 584, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
65. The more severe sixth amendment violations the court was referring to were:
(1) the complete deprivation of counsel as occurred in Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and
(2) a breach of confidentiality by listening directly to a criminal defendant's consultation
with his attorney as the situation which occurred in Coplon, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir.
1951) and Barber, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 598 P.2d 818, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1979). Tambor-
rino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 584, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
66. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 584, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
67. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Chapman harmless error rule
is: the error is harmless and the conviction must stand if an appellate court concludes,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error had no impact upon the finding of guilt. Id. at
24.
68. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 584, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
explained that the trial judge's questions did not imply that the
judge disbelieved the defendant's testimony.69 The court also dis-
missed the defendant's assertion that the judge assumed the role of
prosecutor.
70
In determining that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, 1 the majority recounted the evidence against the defendant;
including the type of distinctive hat found in his car, his possession
of a handgun, his possession of a Datsun automobile with the suspect
license number, and his fingerprint on the jewelry box.7 12 The major-
ity pointed out that if Clarke was trying to set Tamborrino up, it
"seems only reasonable that ...she would have readily identified
him . . . from the photo line up." a73 The court explained that
Tamborrino was not very credible because he admitted two prior
convictions for robbery74 and gave a false name to the officer when
he was arrested. 5
Although the court acknowledged that the jury requested a read-
ing of Tamborrino's testimony, the court stated that it could not
speculate that the jury thought it was a close case. 76 The majority
asserted that the defendant lost because of the strength of the evi-
dence against him and the weakness of his own case.77 The court
then concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt because the error by the judge did not contribute to the
conviction. 8
C. The Dissenting Opinion of the Court of Appeals
The dissent written by Justice Johnson, agreed with the majority
that the trial judge breached Tamborrino's attorney-client
privilege.79 However, the dissent contended that the effect of the er-
ror denied Tamborrino his constitutional right to counsel.80 Accord-
ingly, Judge Johnson believed the conviction should be automatically
69. Id.
70. Id. at 584, 263 Cal. Rptr. 736.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 586, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
73. Id.
74. Id. Tamborrino admitted to two prior felony convictions for robbery after the
judge had ruled that he would allow the prosecution to offer the prior convictions as
evidence. Id. at 591, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
75. Id. at 586, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
76. Id. at 587, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
77. Id. at 588, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
78. Id. at 585, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
79. Id. at 591, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
80. Id. The judge stated that without a guarantee of confidentiality, a criminal
defendant will be deprived of effective assistance of counsel because a criminal defendant
may refrain from disclosing information vital to his defense to his attorney. Id.
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reversed instead of subject to the harmless error rule."'
The dissent stated that the attorney-client privilege must be
strictly protected in order to implement the sixth amendment right
to counsel.8 2 The attorney-client privilege assures the defendant ade-
quate and effective legal representation because it allows and encour-
ages full disclosure to the attorney. Absent an absolute guarantee
of confidentiality, a defendant may be deprived of effective assis-
tance of counsel because he may fear disclosing critical facts to his
attorney.84 Citing Barber v. Municipal Court,15 the dissent pointed
out that the California Supreme Court has held that "the right to
counsel guaranteed by the California Constitution embodies the
right to communicate in absolute privacy with one's attorney."8 6
The dissent described the error by the trial judge as "of the most
obvious and fundamental nature . . .. [a]nd of constitutional
dimension."8a In the dissent's view, this type of error deserves the
"sharpest possible sanction," because it discourages the full and open
communication between defendants and their attorneys.88
Although the dissent contended that the error mandated an auto-
matic reversal, it proceeded to apply the harmless error rule because
"properly construed, [the harmless error rule] likewise dictates re-
versal of the instant case."8' 9 Under the dissent's construction of the
harmless error rule, an appellate court must reverse a conviction
"unless it can fairly find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defend-
ant would have been convicted even if the error had not been com-
mitted."'' 0 This construction of the harmless error rule requires the
remaining case against the defendant to be overwhelming before the
error can be considered harmless.9 It is not enough that a reasona-
ble juror could have found the defendant guilty without the error.92
81. Id. at 595, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 743 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 593, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 741 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14 (1970)).
84. Id. at 593-94, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 742 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
85. 24 Cal. 3d 742, 598 P.2d 818, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1979).
86. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 594, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 742 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id. at 595, 263 Cal. Rptr. 743 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 595-96, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 743 (Johnson, J. dissenting).
89. Id. at 596, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 743 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
90. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 596, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 744 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
92. Id. Under the harmless error rule, the error is not harmless if a juror merely
could have found the defendant guilty. Id. The harmless error rule requires an appellate
court to find beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant would have been convicted
According to the dissent, the Tamborrino case was a credibility
contest between the victim and the defendant. 3 Most of the evidence
"not only about the identity of the robbers but that she was robbed
at all came directly and solely from Ms. Clarke. '9 4 The only evi-
dence independent of Ms. Clarke's testimony was the defendant's
fingerprint. One fingerprint does not prove guilt.95 It only proves that
the defendant touched the box for some reason.96 In fact, the defend-
ant's story, "if believed, accounted for and discredited all evidence
against him." 7
Accordingly, any error which would impugn the defendant's credi-
bility would tip the scales in favor of the prosecution. 98 The judge's
questions created the inference that the defendant was lying and that
the events he testified to (Tamborrino selling Clarke cocaine) never
happened. 99 The "clear effect" of the trial judge's questions was to
discredit the defendant.100
The dissent explained that the only way to counteract the
prejudice caused by the negative inference would be for the defense
counsel to take the stand and reveal his trial strategy. 10 1 The defense
counsel would have to explain why he did not reveal this information
earlier.10 2 The dissent stated, ". . . the only way to overcome the
prejudice caused ... is to further expand the inquiry [into confiden-
tial attorney-client communications] and thus further eviscerate the
attorney-client privilege."103
The dissent concluded that "there is no responsible way a review-
ing court could conclude that the People have proved 'beyond a rea-
sonable doubt' that had the trial judge not committed these errors,
the jury still would have reached the same verdict." 104 Because the
trial judge questioned the defendant regarding confidential attorney-
client communications, the defendant was deprived of the right to
even if the error had not been committed, before the error can be considered harmless.
Id. at 596, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 743 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 600, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 746 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The Trial judge
recognized how close a case this was because the judge granted the prosecutions request
to introduce evidence of the two prior convictions. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting). The
judged granted the request because he felt the case against the defendant was not strong,
Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 597, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 744 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. The defendant testified he must have touched the box when he was selling
Ms. Clark bad cocaine. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 597, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 744 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 598, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 745 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 601, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 747 (Johnson J., dissenting).
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have his case decided by untainted jurors. 105
III. THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE As APPLIED To SIXTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
In Chapman v. California,"0 6 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
some constitutional errors may be subject to the harmless error
rule.10 7 However, the Court explained that certain "constitutional
rights [are] so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error."'0 8 The Court stated, in Rose v. Clark,0 9
that harmless error analysis "presupposes a trial, at which the de-
fendant, represented by counsel, may present evidence and argument
before an impartial judge and jury." 10
105. Id. at 600, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 746 (Johnson J., dissenting).
106. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
107. Id. at 22. Among the constitutional errors that the U.S. Supreme Court has
expressly or impliedly held subject to the Chapman harmless error rule are: failure to
permit cross-examination concerning witness bias (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673 (1986)); denial of the right to be present at trial (Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114
(1983)), improper comment on defendants' failure to testify (United States v. Hasting,
461 U.S. 499 (1983)); admission of witness identification obtained in violation of the
right to counsel (Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977)); admission of confession in
violation to the right to counsel (Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972)); admission
of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment (Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970)); failure of the court to give lesser-included offense instruction (Hopper v.
Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982)); due process right against a burden shifting jury instruction
(Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986)); the due process right against improper
prosecutorial argument (Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)); the due process
right against unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedures (Manson v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. 98, 113-14 (1977)); violations of the right of confrontation upon the admission
of inculpatory out-of-court statements made by nontestifying codefendants (Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973)); the sixth amendment right not to be inter-
rogated by government agents once the right to counsel has attached (Milton v. Wain-
wright, 407 U.S. 371, 378 (1972)); and the sixth amendment right to confrontation
(Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1969)).
108. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. The Court then enumerated the types of errors
that could never be considered harmless: a coerced confession (Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560 (1958) But see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. ., 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113
L.Ed. 2d 302 (March 1991) (admission of involuntary confession at a capital murder
trial held subject to harmless-error analysis), reh'g denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct.
2067, 114 L. Ed. 2d 472 (May 1991)), the denial of the right to counsel (Gideon v
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)), and the denial of a trial by an impartial trial judge
(Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)). Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
109. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
110. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). In Rose, the court applied the
harmless error rule to an erroneous jury instruction. The Court explained however, that
some types of constitutional errors could never be subject to a harmless error rule: intro-
duction of a coerced confession, the complete denial of right to counsel, and adjudication
by a biased trial judge. Id. at 578. But see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. -, I I1 S.
Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (March 1991) (admission of involuntary confession at a
Accordingly, some errors require reversal without regard to their
amount of prejudice because "some errors necessarily render a trial
fundamentally unfair." '111 One of the errors included in this category
is the denial of right to counsel. 1 2 The court hearing Gideon v.
Wainwright'" ruled that complete denial of counsel was per se re-
versible error.11 4 The doctrine of per se reversal has also been ex-
tended to apply to the denial of counsel during an overnight re-
cess. 115 In Perry v. Leeke,"8 the Court stated that "'[a]ctual or
constructive denial of assistance of counsel altogether,' is not subject
to [a] . . . prejudice analysis." 117
Beside Tamborrino, no other case has addressed the constitution-
ality of a trial judge violating a criminal defendant's attorney-client
privilege in the presence of a jury.118 Courts have addressed the
analogous situation of a government agent who intercepts confiden-
tial communication between a criminal defendant and his or her at-
torney, and uses the information to the detriment of the defendant.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Weatherford v. Bursey addressed the
issue of an undercover government agent who attended attorney-cli-
ent meetings of a criminal defendant. 1 9
In Weatherford, Bursey and Weatherford were arrested for van-
dalizing a selective service office in Columbia, South Carolina. 120 In
order to maintain his undercover status, Weatherford, the under-
cover agent, did not reveal that he was a government agent.' 2 ' At
the request of Bursey, Weatherford was invited to attend meetings
with Bursey and Bursey's attorney. 22 Weatherford attended two
such meetings at which defense strategies were discussed. 2 3 Wea-
therford did not discuss with his superiors or with the prosecution
capital murder trial held subject to harmless-error analysis), reh'g denied, - U.S.
-, 111 S. Ct. 2067, 114 L. Ed. 2d 472 (May 1991).
111. Rose, 478 U.S. at 578.
112. Id. at 577.
113. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
114. Id. Gideon involved an indigent defendant that was charged with breaking
and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor. Id. This offense was a felony
under Florida law. Id. at 336-37. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned a Florida Su-
preme Court ruling that held that an indigent defendant is not entitled to appointed
counsel for a felony charge unless the charge is a capital offense. Id at 337. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment. Id. at 335.
115. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 280.
118. Tamborrino, 215 Cal App. 3d at 595 n.8, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 743 n.8 (Johnson,
J., dissenting).
119. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
120. Id. at 548.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 547-48.
[VOL. 28: 429, 1991] People v. Tamborrino
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
any information "regarding [Bursey's] trial plans, strategy, or any-
thing having to do with the criminal action pending against
[Bursey] ."124
The Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment does not es-
tablish a per se reversal rule when a government agent merely at-
tends an attorney-client meeting.125 The Court reasoned that the sole
fact that the agent met with the defendant and his attorney did not
violate the defendant's right to counsel. 126 In dicta, the Court stated:
[h]ad Weatherford testified at Bursey's trial as to the conversation between
Bursey and [his attorney]; had any of the State's evidence originated in
these conversations; had those overheard conversations been used in any
other way to the substantial detriment to Bursey; or even had the prosecu-
tion learned from Weatherford, an undercover agent, the details of the Bur-
sey-[attorney] conversations about trial preparations, [the defendant] would
have a much stronger case.
127
The court noted that "the constitutionality of the conviction depends
on whether the overheard conversations have produced . . . any of
the evidence offered at trial. 128
IV. ANALYSIS
In Tamborrino, the majority held that a violation of a defendant's
attorney-client privilege in the presence of a jury is subject to the
harmless error rule of Chapman.2 ' The majority distinguished the
situation in Tamborrino, where a judge revealed confidential attor-
ney-client conversations for the jury, from the previously discussed
case law where an undercover agent intercepted attorney-client com-
munications and conveyed the information to the prosecution for use
against the defendant.'3 0
Although the infringement upon the defendant's right to counsel is
just as severe when a judge violates the attorney-client privilege as
124. Id.
125. Id. at 557-58.
126. Id. at 558-59.
127. Id. at 554 (Emphasis added).
128. Id. at 552. The Federal circuit courts as well as the California Supreme
Court have differing interpretations of the requirements necessary to establish a sixth
amendment violation and whether a rule of per se reversal should apply when a defend-
ant's attorney-client privilege is impaired. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part
IV of this Note.
129. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d 575, 263 Cal. Rptr. 731. The Chapman harm-
less error rule is: the error is harmless and the conviction must stand if an appellate court
concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error had no impact upon the finding of
guilt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966).
130. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 583, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
when an undercover agent violates the privilege, the court ruled that
the harmless error rule applies when there is no "physical invasion"
of the defendant's consultation with his attorney.131 However, when
there is a physical interception of confidential attorney-client com-
munications by a government agent, both federal and California
courts have held that the error is automatically reversible.
13 2
Apparently, no other cases in California or the federal courts have
expressly considered whether this type of action by a trial judge
makes a case reversible per se.133 The closest case authority for de-
termining if there is a sixth amendment violation requiring an auto-
matic reversal is Weatherford v. Bursey."' As previously discussed,
the Supreme Court in Weatherford stated in dicta that "unless..,
[the disclosure of the confidential conversations] created at least a
realistic possibility of injury ... there can be no Sixth Amendment
violation". 135 The Supreme Court's dicta in Weatherford seems am-
biguous.1 36 The opinion by the Supreme Court does not rule out per
se reversal if confidential communication is disclosed at trial.137 On
the other hand, the opinion does not mandate automatic reversal if
confidential communication is revealed at trial either.
38
In deciding Weatherford, the Supreme Court distinguished Black
v. United States' and O'Brien v. United States14 ° from Weather-
ford. In Weatherford, the government agent did not communicate to
the prosecution any information gained while attending the defend-
ant's conference with his attorney. 41 In contrast, in both Black and
O'Brien, confidential communications between the defendants and
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Cadwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Coplon v.
United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951); and Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal.
3d 742, 598 P.2d 818, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1979).
133. Tamborrino, 215 Cal App. 3d at 595 n.8, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 743 n.8 (Johnson,
J., dissenting).
134. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
135. Id. at 559.
136. See infra note 142.
137. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559; See supra text accompanying note 129.
138. See United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 1978). In reference to
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Weatherford, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Levy stated:
[w]e think that the Court was suggesting by negative inference that a sixth
amendment violation would be found where, as here, defense strategy was ac-
tually disclosed or where, as here, the government enforcement officials sought
such confidential information. Whether or not that negative inference was in-
tended, the Court certainly did not lay down a rule that when actual disclosure
occurred, additional prejudice must be found." Id.
The court in Levy reversed the lower court's ruling that whether a case should be
overturned or not would turn on whether a government informer's disclosure prejudiced
the defendant. Id.
139. 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
140. 386 U.S. 345 (1967).
141. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 548.
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their attorneys were conveyed to the prosecution.142 The Court re-
fused to remand the cases for hearings to determine whether the in-
trusions had tainted the evidence at trial; instead the court remanded
the cases for new trials.143 If the Court had remanded the cases for
hearings to determine if the intrusions had tainted the trial, the ef-
fect would have been to apply the harmless error rule. By refusing to
remand for hearings, the Court may have implicitly rejected the ap-
plication of the harmless error rule to the invasion of the attorney-
client privilege.
1 44
A. The Interpretation of Weatherford by the U.S. Courts of
Appeals
Although some circuit courts1 45 require the defendant show that
he has been prejudiced before claiming a sixth amendment violation,
other circuits 14  do not. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit explained that the amount of harm required to
make out a claim for sixth amendment violation does not "have to
amount to 'prejudice' in the sense of altering the actual outcome of
the trial. '1 47 The Third Circuit has held that prejudice will be pre-
sumed when confidential information is disclosed to a government
informer. 48 However, the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits require the defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice or
that the disclosure resulted in some benefit to the government. 149
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "[a] Sixth
Amendment violation cannot be established without a showing that
142. Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966), O'Brien v. United States, 386
U.S. 345 (1967). In both Black and O'Brien, conversations between the criminal defend-
ants and their attorneys were overheard via electronic listening devices. Black, 385 U.S.
26, O'Brien, 386 U.S. 345.
143. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144. The Court may also have been applying its own prejudice analysis to the case.
145. The First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits require that the defend-
ant show that he was prejudiced. See United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907
(Ist Cir. 1984); United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d
228, 234 (8th Cir. 1986); and Clutchette v. Rusher, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir.
1985).
146. The Third Circuit and the D.C. Circuit do not require a showing of prejudice
to establish a sixth amendment violation.
See United States v Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 1984); Cadwell v. United
States, 205 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
147. Briggs v. Goodman, 698 F.2d 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
148. United States v Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 1984).
149. See infra text accompanying notes 154-60.
there is a 'realistic possibility of injury' to defendants or 'benefit to
the State.' "150 If the defendant proves that the confidential informa-
tion was communicated to the government, the burden shifts to the
government to prove that no prejudice resulted. 151
The Second Circuit requires a defendant to prove he was
prejudiced to establish a Sixth Amendment violation. 52 The Second
Circuit held that when a violation of the attorney-client privilege re-
sults from the unintentional presence 5 ' of a government agent, a de-
fendant must show that privileged communication passed to the
prosecutor and resulted in prejudice to the defendant. 54 To show
prejudice, the defendant must prove "that a prosecution witness tes-
tified concerning privileged communications, that prosecution evi-
dence originated in such communications, or. that such communica-
tions have been used in any other way to the substantial detriment of
the defendant "1.... 155
The Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits require the defendant to
show he was prejudiced by the governmental interference with the
confidential relationship in order to establish a Sixth Amendment vi-
olation.15 6 However, to show prejudice, the defendant need only show
that the information gained by the intrusion was used against the
defendant at trial, among other ways.1 57 Once a defendant shows
150. United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (Ist Cir. 1984).
151. Id. at 907-08. In addition to demonstrating the realistic possibility of injury,
the defendant must prove that the confidential information was passed to the govern-
ment. Id.
152. United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1985).
153. Unintentional presence would occur when an undercover agent is invited to
meet with the defendant and his attorney. In order to preserve his cover and avoid suspi-
cion, the agent accepts the invitation and attends the meeting without revealing his un-
dercover status.
154. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d at 833.
155. Id.
156. United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1986); Clutchette v. Rusher, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471
(9th Cir. 1985).
157. United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1984); Mastrian v. Mc-
Manus, 554 F.2d 813, 821 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182,
1187 (9th Cir. 1980).
In Steele, the court implied that to show prejudice the defendant must show that "the
government obtained directly or indirectly any evidence used at trial . . .; that any
information gained by [the government agent] was used in any manner to the substantial
detriment of [the] defendant; or that the details about defense trial preparations were
learned by the government." Steele, 727 F.2d at 586.
The court stated, in Mastrian, that "the accused must show ... that the substance of
the overheard conversation was of some benefit to enforcement officials." Mastrian v.
McManus, 554 F.2d at 821.
In Irwin, the court stated that prejudice "results when evidence gained through the
interference is used against the defendant at trial. It also can result from the prosecu-
tion's use of confidential information pertaining to the defense plans and strategy, from
government influence which destroys the defendant's confidence in his attorney, and from
other actions designed to give the prosecution an unfair advantage at trial." Irwin, 612
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that the information gained by the intrusion into the attorney-client
relation was used against the defendant at trial, the defendant is en-
titled to an automatic reversal.158
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit do not require
a defendant to show prejudice to claim a sixth amendment viola-
tion. 159 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
prejudice, and thus a sixth amendment violation, is presumed when
confidential defense strategy is disclosed to the government by an
informer. 160 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated that
the defendant need not prove the prosecution has actually used the
information because "[m]ere possession ... of otherwise confidential
knowledge about the defense's strategy or position is sufficient.., to
establish detriment to the criminal defendant".161 Citing Weather-
ford, the D.C. Circuit stated, "[s]uch information is 'inherently det-
rimental[J . . . unfairly advantage[s] the prosecution, and
threaten[s] to subvert the adversary system of criminal justice.' ",162
The Third Circuit's reasoning was that the Supreme Court, in
Weatherford, "was suggesting by negative inference" that if confi-
dential attorney-client communications were disclosed to the prose-
cution, there would be a sixth amendment violation mandating a re-
versal.163 Accordingly, the Third Circuit expressly rejected a rule
which would require a court to weigh the amount of prejudice
caused by the disclosure on a case by case basis.
6 4
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a standard
which requires a court to weigh the amount of prejudice caused by a
sixth amendment violation is inappropriate for three reasons.
165
First, a trial court would be faced with the virtually "impossible
F.2d at 1187.
158. United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1984); Mastrian v. Mc-
Manus, 554 F.2d 813, 821 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182,
1187 (9th Cir. 1980).
159. United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 1984); Briggs v. Good-
man, 698 F.2d 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
160. United States v Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 257 (citing United States v. Levy,
577 F.2d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 1978)).
161. Briggs v. Goodman, 698 F.2d 486, 494-95.
162. Id. at 495.
163. United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d at 210.
164. Id. The court stated: "Since in this case an actual disclosure of defense strat-
egy occurred and since we reject the proposed rule that the damage done by such disclo-
sure should be weighed on a case-by-case basis, we must consider what remedy is appro-
priate. In our judgement, the only appropriate remedy is the dismissal of the
indictment." Id.
165. Id.
task" of determining whether the disclosure influenced the outcome
of the case.18 6 Second, not all government attorneys can be relied on
to be candid about the scope of the information that they received.
1 67
Finally, there is a genuine risk that some law enforcement agents
would not admit that information was obtained in violation of the
sixth amendment.168 According to the Third Circuit, a harmless er-
ror rule "would disturb the balance implicit in the adversary system
and would thus jeopardize the very process by which guilt and inno-
cence are determined in our society." 169
The Supreme Court's statement in Glasser v. U.S.17 0 supports the
Third Circuit's application of the per se reversal rule. In Glasser, the
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he right to have the assistance of
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its de-
nial. '171 In fact, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ob-
served that the per se reversal rule has been applied where the gov-
ernment's intrusion upon the attorney-client privilege has been "an
offensive interference ... without any justification.
17 2
Although no federal courts have applied the harmless error rule of
Chapman to a violation of the defendant's attorney-client privilege,
the federal courts are reluctant to reverse a conviction unless the
invasion into the attorney-client privilege results in prejudice.1 73 An
example of the court's reluctance to reverse is United States v. Mor-
rison.17 4 In Morrison, federal agents met with the defendant without
her attorney's permission.1 75 Although the defendant did not incrimi-
nate herself or supply any information relevant to her case, she
claimed her sixth amendment right to counsel was violated.178 The
Supreme Court stated, "[t]he premise of our prior cases is that the
constitutional infringement identified has had or threatens some ad-
verse effect upon the effectiveness of counsel's representation or...
166. Id. at 208. A standard which allows a court to weigh the amount of prejudice
caused by a sixth amendment violation would require the court to speculate about the
amount of prejudice caused by the disclosure. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 209.
170. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
171. Id. at 76.
172. United States v. Gartner, 818 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing United
States v Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1951); Cadwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953); United
States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1972); and United States v. Lusterino, 450 F.2d
572 (2d Cir. 1971)).
173. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
174. Id.
.175. Id. at 362.
176. Id. at 362-63.
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some other prejudice to the defense."1 "Absent such impact on
the criminal proceeding .... there is no basis for'imposing a remedy
"178
B. Application of Federal Constitutional Law to the Tamborrino
Case
An important distinction must be made between the federal cases
involving government agents intercepting confidential attorney-client
communications and Tamborrino. In the federal cases, the intercep-
tion of the confidential communication between the attorney and the
defendant occurs prior to trial.17 9 When confidential communication
is intercepted prior to trial, courts are reluctant to grant relief to a
defendant unless the information either threatens or is actually used
to the detriment of the defendant. 180 If the jury is never exposed to
the confidential communication and the prosecution is prevented
from benefiting from disclosure, 181 the intrusion by the government
would not have an effect on the trial. In contrast, the disclosure of
confidential information in Tamborrino occurred at trial in front of
the jury.'82 The disclosure in front of a jury is much more likely to
effect the outcome of the trial because the privileged communication
is presented directly to the trier of fact.'83
Because the confidential conversations by Tamborrino were used
177. Id. at 365.
178. Id.
179. Cadwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1953); U.S. v. Mas-
troianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (Ist Cir. 1984); United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823,
833 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 1984); United
States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1984); Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d
813, 821 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977); and United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir.
1980).
180. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361. There are three ways that the confi-
dential information between the attorney and client could be used to the detriment of the
defendant: (1) the privileged information is used against the defendant at trial, (2) the
privileged information is used by the prosecution to prepare its case and (3) the privi-.
leged information enables the government to obtain other evidence against the defendant.
See, e.g. United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1984).
181. The prosecution could benefit when the illegal obtained information leads
them to other evidence or when the prosecution learns the trial strategy and is able to
anticipate the defense.
182. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 591, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
183. In United States v. Arthur, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
when a judge asked a defendant about advice given to him by his attorney in a previous
trial, the inquiry had no effect on the outcome of the trial because the inquiry took place
outside the presence of the jury. 602 F.2d 660, 664 (4th Cir. 1979).
at trial, Tamborrino established that he was prejudiced. 184 Having
shown that he was prejudiced by the use of the privileged communi-
cations, Tamborrino established a sixth amendment violation even
under the most rigorous standard laid down by the U.S. Courts of
Appeals. 185 Accordingly, the error by the trial judge (exposing the
confidential attorney-client communication to the jurors) is automat-
ically reversible and does not require any further demonstration of
harm to the defendant. Therefore, Tamborrino's conviction should be
overturned under the U.S. Courts of Appeals' interpretation of
Weatherford. 8
C. Establishing a Violation of the Right to Counsel Under
California Law'
8 7
The leading California case with facts similar to Weatherford is
Barber v. Municipal Court.188 The Supreme Court of California held
that it was reversible per se when an undercover police officer merely
attended a confidential meeting with the defendants and their attor-
ney.189 Even though the undercover police officer did not communi-
cate information to the prosecution, the court stated that the intru-
sion into the attorney client-relationship violated the right under
California law to communicate privately with counsel. 190
The Barber case involved fifty anti-nuclear power demonstrators
who were arrested along with two undercover police officers for tres-
passing and unlawful assembly.' 9' Forty of the arrested demonstra-
tors agreed upon joint representation. 9 An undercover police officer
184. United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (Ist Cir. 1984); United
States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v Costanzo, 740
F.2d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v.-Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir.
1984); Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 821 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977); and United
States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980).
185. See supra text accompanying note 159.
186. United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir. 1984); United
States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v Costanzo, 740
F.2d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir.
1984); Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 821 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977); and United
States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980).
187. The California Legislative Proposition 115 (1990) has eliminated the ability
of a criminal defendant to rely on Constitutional rights grounded in California law after
July 1 1990. Tamborrino, however, was decided before the effective date of Proposition
115. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d 575, 263 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1989).
188. 24 Cal. 3d. 742, 598 P.2d 818, 157 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1979).
189. Id. at 756, 598 P.2d at 826, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
190. Id. The court remarked the defendants "no longer feel they can freely, can-
didly, and with complete confidence discuss their case with their attorney". Id. The court
stated that, "[t]he right to confer privately with one's attorney is 'one of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the American criminal law - a right that no legislator or court can
ignore or violate' ". Id. at 760, 598 P.2d at 828, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 668 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 747, 598 P.2d at 820, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
192. Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d at 767, 598 P.2d at 833, 157 Cal.
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who posed as a defendant attended numerous confidential attorney-
client conferences where defense strategy was discussed.193
Prior to trial, the demonstrators discovered that one of their code-
fendants was an undercover police officer.194 After learning of the
undercover agent's true identity, the defendants became suspicious of
one another and were reluctant to cooperate with the defense coun-
sel.119 5 However, during the hearing on a motion to dismiss, it was
determined that no confidential information had been disclosed to
the prosecution. 196 As a result, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss,19 7 but ordered the prosecution to refrain from using evidence
for rebuttal purposes unless the prosecution could prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the evidence was obtained independently of
the undercover agent.19 ' The California Supreme Court reversed and
held that the error was per se reversible and ordered the suit dis-
missed.1 9 The California Supreme Court stated that the California
Constitution gives a defendant the right to communicate with his or
her attorney in absolute privacy. 200 The Court stated, "if an accused
is to derive the full benefits of his right to counsel, he must have the
assurance of confidentiality and privacy of communication with his
attorney. '0 1 Quoting a U.S. Supreme Court case,20 2 the court ex-
plained, "if the client knows that damaging information could be...
obtained from the attorney following disclosure, . . . the client would
be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to ob-
tain fully informed legal advice."2 03 Thus, as the court points out,
the right to consult privately with counsel "involves public policies of
paramount importance."
204
The court then distinguished Barber from Weatherford. The court
Rptr. at 673. (Clark, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 748, 598 P.2d at 820, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 660-61.
194. Id. at 745, 598 P.2d at 819, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
195. Id. at 750, 598 P.2d at 821-22, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 662. Defense counsel testi-
fied that the defendants ability to proceed with their defense was substantially impaired
because the defendants refusal to participate in the meetings with defense counsel. Id.
196. Id. at 750, 598 P.2d at 822, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 760, 598 P.2d at 828, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
200. Id. at 751, 598 P.2d at 822, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
201. Id.
202. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
203. Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d at 751, 598 P.2d at 822, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 662 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
204. Id. at 752, 598 P.2d at 823, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 663. The public policy involved
is the right of the accused to have effective assistance of counsel. Id.
pointed out that in Weatherford there was no specific prejudice
shown or otherwise threatened.2 5 However, in Barber, the defend-
ants demonstrated they were prejudiced because of their inability to
participate in their defense.206 Moreover, the court dismissed Wea-
therford as controlling in Barber because "the right to privacy of
communication between an accused and his attorney [is] grounded
on California Law".207
D. Application of Barber to the Tamborrino Case
In Barber, the California Supreme Court held that the case
against the defendants must be dismissed because an undercover po-
lice officer attended confidential attorney-client conferences of the
accused.208 Barber could be read for the proposition that any intru-
sion by the government into the attorney-client privilege is grounds
for automatic reversal. The majority in Tamborrino apparently re-
jected this interpretation of Barber.20  The majority distinguished
Barber, stating that a question by a trial judge in front of a jury is
not the same as a "direct invasion by a government agent of the
privacy of a defendant's consultation with his attorney. "210
On this point, the current majority rule is that of Tamborrino.
However, the same automatic reversal rule that applies when a gov-
205. Id. at 755, 598 P.2d at 825, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 665. In Weatherford, the un-
dercover government agent who attended confidential meetings with the defendant and
his attorney, did not communicate any information to his superiors or to the prosecution.
Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 556. The Court stated: "[a]s long as the information possessed
by Weatherford [the undercover agent] remained uncommunicated, he posed no substan-
tial threat to Bursey's [the defendant's] Sixth Amendment rights." Id.
206. Barber, 24 Cal. 3d at 756, 598 P.2d at 826, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 666. In Barber,
the court explained that there was direct evidence that the defendants had been
prejudiced. Id. A hearing was held on the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground
that the presence of the police officer at confidential attorney-client conferences had de-
prived the defendants of their right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 745, 598 P.2d
at 819, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the defendant's attorney testified that the
defendants participated actively in meetings with their attorney prior to the revelation
that one of the defendants was a police officer. Id. at 750, 598 P.2d at 821-22, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 662. After the true identity of the police officer was revealed, the defendants,
fearing that there might be other undercover agents among them, were very distrustful of
one another. Id. at 750, 598 P.2d at 822, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 662. As a result of the
suspicion, the plaintiffs became reluctant to reveal information to their counsel and were
unable to receive effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 750, 598 P.2d at 821-22, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 662. Defense counsel further testified that "the defendants ability to proceed
with their defense and to assist [the attorney] in preparing their defense [had] been
substantially impaired" as a result of the government's use of the undercover agent. Id.
207. Barber, 24 Cal. 3d at 755, 598 P.2d at 825, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
208. Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal 3d. 742, 598 P.2d 818, 157 Cal. Rptr.
658. The California Legislative Proposition 115 (1990) has eliminated the ability of a
criminal defendant to rely on Constitutional rights grounded in California law after July
1 1990.
209. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 583, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
210. Id.
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ernment agent intercepts attorney-client communication should ap-
ply when a judge elicits confidential information in front of a jury.
Any question posed by a judge regarding confidential attorney-client
communication is more likely to cause damage to the defendant than
an intrusion by an undercover agent for two reasons. First, the jury
will be directly exposed to the content of the confidential conversa-
tion. Second, the judge is a figure of overpowering influence, and
therefore the jury will give great weight to the judge's questions and
inferences. The disclosure of confidential attorney-client communica-
tion to the jurors will be factored into their verdict, subconsciously or
otherwise, regardless of any limiting instructions.211 Finally, this line
of questioning by the judge constituted impeachment of the witness
before the jury by the judge, giving the appearance of a judicial
opinion that the witness has perjured himself.
Although an inquiry by the judge is not the same as an "invasion
by the government" into attorney-client communication, the detri-
mental effect to the defendant is more severe. Since the content of
the confidential attorney-client communication was presented di-
rectly to the jurors by the trial judge, the jurors in all probability
gave more weight to the inferences drawn by the judge.212
Since an intrusion into attorney-client communication by the
judge is more likely to cause damage to the defendant than a govern-
ment agent intercepting confidential communications, it should war-
rant a more severe sanction. Therefore, the intrusion by the trial
judge should be automatically reversed without an inquiry into the
amount of prejudice.
Under California law, a criminal defendant's right to counsel is
violated if the privacy of his or her attorney-client communication is
involved.213 The policy underlying this rule is to give the accused the
full benefit of the right to counsel.214 If an accused feels his confi-
dences with his attorney will be violated, he will not confide in his
attorney. Absent an ability to freely confide in his attorney, an ac-
cused will be denied the right to counsel.
The same policy of assuring that the defendant has the right to
prepare and present his defense is at stake when a judge reveals, for
the entire jury, the contents of a conversation between the accused
211. No limiting instruction was given in Tamborrino because the trial judge in-
sisted that he had not violated the attorney-client privilege. Tamborrino, 215 Cal. App.
3d at 600, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 746 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 599, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 745-46 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
213. Barber, 24 Cal. 3d at 756, 598 P.2d at 826, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
214. Id. at 751, 598 P.2d at 822, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
and his lawyer. Therefore, the same rule of automatic reversal
should apply when a judge violates the attorney-client privilege as
when a government agent violates it.215 Because the judge violated
Tamborrino's attorney-client privilege in the presence of the jury,
Tamborrino's conviction should have been automatically reversed.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Courts of Appeals have interpreted Weatherford to re-
quire automatic reversal if confidential attorney-client communica-
tions are intercepted by the government and the defendant is
prejudiced.""6 To establish prejudice, generally the defendant needs
to prove that the intercepted communication was actually used to his
detriment.
17
Under this interpretation, Tamborrino's conviction should be over-
turned. Tamborrino demonstrated that he was prejudiced because
the confidential attorney-client communications were used to his det-
riment at trial. Accordingly, Tamborrino's conviction should be auto-
matically reversed under the U.S Courts of Appeals' interpretation
of the Federal Constitution.
Under California law, Tamborrino's conviction should also be au-
tomatically reversed. The same policy in Barber of assuring private
consultation with one's attorney should apply in Tamborrino's case.
Tamborrino's right to consult with his attorney in absolute privacy
was violated by the trial judge when the judge inquired into the con-
fidential communications. Therefore, under the reasoning set forth in
Barber, Tamborrino's conviction should be overturned as well.
215. California Civil Code Section 3511 provides, "[w]here the reason is the same,
the rule should be the same." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3511 (West 1990).
216. The First, Second, Sixth, Eight, and Ninth Circuits require that the defend-
ant show that he was prejudiced. United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (Ist
Cir. 1984); United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 833 ( 2nd Cir. 1985); United States
v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 234
(8th Cir. 1986); Clutchette v. Rusher, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985).
The Third Circuit and the D.C. Circuits do not require a showing of prejudice to
establish a sixth amendment violation. United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 257 (3d
Cir. 1984); Cadwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
217. In the First Circuit, the defendant must prove that privileged communication
was transmitted to the government to show prejudice. United States v. Mastroianni, 749
F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir. 1984).
In the Second Circuit, to show prejudice, the defendant must prove either that the
prosecution witness testified concerning privileged conversations, or that the prosecution's
evidence originated in the privileged conversation, or that the privileged communication
has been used to the detriment of the defendant in some other way. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d
at 833.
In the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must
show that the information was used against the defendant at trial, among other ways.
United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1984); Mastrian v. McManus, 554
F.2d 813, 821 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th
Cir. 1980). See supra note 161.
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The attorney-client relationship goes to the very heart of the Con-
stitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Public confidence
in the legal system will be eroded if judges are allowed to inquire
into the confidential communication between an accused and his at-
torney. To this end, an invasion of the attorney-client privilege by a
trial judge in the presence of jury, merits the sharpest possible sanc-
tion: a rule of per se reversal.
Once the confidential attorney-client information is disclosed in an
open courtroom, the information is likely to cause the defendant
prejudice. Any rule other than a rule of automatic reversal would
require speculation by the court to determine the actual impact of
the wrongful disclosure upon the jury. Since the right to communi-
cate in privacy with one's attorney is considered fundamental, the
courts should not be at liberty to speculate as to the amount of
prejudice caused by the judge's invasion. Although the harmless er-
ror rule provides some deterrence to judges from violating a defend-
ant's attorney-client privilege,21 8 a stronger deterrent is necessary.
CHARLES R. KIMMEL
218. A judge may be required to sit through a retrial and suffer the embarrass-
ment of reversal under the harmless error rule.

